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Abstract
Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness
cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks,
most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central authority.
Instead, Internet-like networks emerge from strategic decisions of many selfish agents.
Interestingly, although lacking a coordinating authority, such naturally grown net-
works are surprisingly robust while at the same time having desirable properties like
a small diameter. To investigate this phenomenon we present the first simple model
for selfish network creation which explicitly incorporates agents striving for a central
position in the network while at the same time protecting themselves against ran-
dom edge-failure. We show that networks in our model are diverse and we prove the
versatility of our model by adapting various properties and techniques from the non-
robust versions which we then use for establishing bounds on the Price of Anarchy.
Moreover, we analyze the computational hardness of finding best possible strategies
and investigate the game dynamics of our model.
1 Introduction
Networks are everywhere and we crucially rely on their functionality. Hence it is no
surprise that designing networks under various objective functions is a well established
research area in the intersection of Operations Research, Computer Science and Eco-
nomics. However, investigating how to create suitable networks from scratch is of limited
use for understanding most of nowadays networks. The reason for this is that most of our
resource, communication and online social networks have not been created and designed
by some central authority. Instead, these critical networks emerged from the interaction
of many selfish agents who control and shape parts of the network. This clearly calls for
a game-theoretic perspective.
One of the most prominent examples of such a selfishly created network is the Internet,
which essentially is a network of sub-networks which are each owned and controlled by
Internet service providers (ISP). Each ISP decides selfishly how to connect to other ISPs
and thereby balancing the cost for creating links (buying the necessary hardware and/or
peering agreement contracts for routing traffic) and the obtained service quality for its
customers. Interestingly, although the Internet is undoubtedly an important and critical
infrastructure, there is no central authority which ensures its functionality if parts of
the network fail. Despite this fact, the Internet seems to be robust against node or edge
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failures, which hints that a socially beneficial property like network robustness may emerge
from selfish behavior.
Modeling agents with a desire for creating a robust network has long been neglected
and was started to be investigated only very recently. This paper contributes to this
endeavor by proposing and analyzing a model of selfish network creation, which explicitly
incorporates agents who strive for occupying a central position in the network while at the
same time ensuring that the overall network remains functional even under edge-failure.
1.1 Related Work
Previous research on game-theoretic models for network creation has either focused on
centrality models, where the agents’ service quality in the created network depends on the
distances to other agents, or on reachability models where agents only care about being
connected to many other agents.
Some prominent examples of centrality models for selfish network creation are [12, 9,
6, 7, 2, 17, 8]. They all have in common that agents correspond to nodes in a network
and that the edge set of the network is determined by the combination of the agents’
strategies. The utility function of an agent contains a service quality term which depends
on the distances to all other agents. To the best of our knowledge the very recent paper
by Meirom et al. [18] is the only centrality model which incorporates edge-failures. The
authors consider two types of agents, major-league and minor-league agents, which main-
tain that the network remains 2-connected while trying to minimize distances, which are a
linear combination of the length of a shortest path and the length of a best possible vertex
disjoint backup path. Under some specific assumptions, e.g. that there are significantly
more minor-league than major-league agents, they prove various structural properties of
equilibrium networks and investigate the corresponding game-dynamics. In contrast to
this, we will investigate a much simpler model with homogeneous agents which is more
suitable for analyzing networks created by equal peers. Our results can be understood as
zooming in on the sub-network formed by the major-league agents (i.e. top tier ISPs).
In reachability models, e.g. [4, 14, 5, 10, 3, 11], the service quality of an agent is
simply defined as the number of reachable agents and distances are ignored completely.
For reachability models the works of Kliemann [14, 15] and the very recent paper by Goyal
et al. [11] explicitly incorporate a notion of network robustness in the utility function of
every agent. All models consider an external adversary who strikes after the network
is built. In [14, 15] the adversary randomly removes a single edge and the agents try
to maximize the expected number of reachable nodes post attack. Two versions of the
adversary are analyzed: edge removal uniformly at random or removal of the edge which
hurts the society of agents most. For the former adversary a constant Price of Anarchy
is shown, whereas for the latter adversary this positive result is only true if edges can
be created unilaterally. In [11] nodes are attacked (and killed) and this attack spreads
virus-like to neighboring nodes unless they are protected by a firewall. Interestingly also
this model has a low Price of Anarchy and the authors prove a tight linear bound on the
amount of edge-overbuilding due to the adversary.
1.2 Model and Notation
We consider the Network Creation Game (NCG) by Fabrikant et al. [9] augmented with
the uniform edge-deletion adversary from Kliemann [14] and we call our model Adversary
NCG (Adv-NCG). More specifically, in an Adv-NCG there are n selfish agents which
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correspond to the nodes of an undirected multi-graph G = (V,E) and we will use the
terms agent and node interchangeably. A pure strategy Su of agent u ∈ V (G) is any
multi-set over elements from V \ {u}. If v is contained k times in Su then this encodes
that agent u wants to create k undirected edges to node v. Moreover we say that u
is the owner of all edges to the nodes in Su. We emphasize the edge-ownership in our
illustrations by drawing directed edges which point away from their owner - all edges are
nonetheless understood to be undirected. Given an n-dimensional vector of pure strategies
for all agents, then the union of all the edges encoded in all agents’ pure strategies defines
the edge set E of the multi-graph G. Since there is a bijection of multi-graphs with
edge-ownership information and pure strategy-vectors, we will use networks and strategy-
vectors interchangeably, e.g. by saying that a network is in equilibrium.
The agents prepare for an adversarial attack on the network after creation. This attack
deletes one edge uniformly at random. Hence, agents try to minimize the attack’s impact
on themselves by minimizing their expected cost. Let G− e denote the network G where
edge e is removed. Let δG(u) =
∑
v∈V (G) dG(u, v), where dG(u, v) is the number of edges
of a shortest path from u to v in network G. Let
distG(u) =
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
δG−e(u) =
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
∑
v∈V
dG−e(u, v)
denote agent u’s expected distance cost after the adversary has removed some edge uni-
formly at random from G. The expected cost of an agent u in network G = (V,E) with
edge-price α is defined as costu(G,α) = edgeu(G,α) + distG(u), where edgeu(G,α) =
α · |Su| is the total edge-cost for agent u with strategy Su in (G,α). Thus, compared to
the NCG [9], the distance cost term is replaced by the expected distance cost with respect
to uniform edge deletion.
Let (G,α) be any network with edge-ownership information. We call any strategy-
change from Su to S
′
u of some agent u a move. Specifically, if |Su| = |S′u|, then such a
move is called a multi-swap, if |Su ∩S′u| < |Su| − 2 and a swap if |Su ∩S′u| = |Su| − 2. If a
move of agent u strictly decreases agent u’s cost, then it is called an improving move. If no
improving move exists, then we say that agent u plays its best response. Analogously we
call a strategy-change towards a best response a best response move. A sequence of best
response moves which starts and ends with network (G,α) is called a best response cycle.
We say that (G,α) is in Pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) if all agents play a best response.
We measure the overall quality of a network (G,α) with its social cost, which is
defined as cost(G,α) =
∑
u∈V (G) costu(G,α) = edge(G,α) + dist(G), where edge(G,α) =∑
u∈V (G) edgeu(G,α) = α · |E| and dist(G) =
∑
u∈V (G) distG(u). Let OPT (n, α) be
a network on n nodes with edge-price α which minimizes the social cost and we call
OPT(n, α) the optimum network for n and α. Let maxNE(n, α) be the maximum social
cost of any NE network on n agents with edge-price α and analogously let minNE(n, α)
be the NE having minimum social cost. Then, the Price of Anarchy is the maximum over
all n and α of the ratio maxNE(n,α)OPT(n,α) , whereas the Price of Stability is the maximum over
all n and α of the ratio minNE(n,α)OPT (n,α) .
1.3 Our Contribution
This paper introduces and analyzes an accessible model, the Adv-NCG, for selfish network
creation in which agents strive for a central position in the network while protecting
against random edge-failures.
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We show that optimum networks in the Adv-NCG are much more diverse than without
adversary, which also indicates that the same holds true for the Nash equilibria of the
game. However, we also show that many techniques and results from the NCG can be
adapted to cope with the Adv-NCG, which indicates that the influence of the adversary
is limited. In particular, we prove NP-hardness of computing a best possible strategy
and W[2]-hardness of computing a best multi-swap. Moreover, we show that the Adv-
NCG is not weakly acyclic, which is the strongest possible non-convergence result for any
game. On the positive side, we prove that the amount of edge-overbuilding due to the
adversary is limited, which is then used for proving that upper bounding the diameter
essentially bounds the Price of Anarchy from above. We apply this by adapting two
diameter-bounding techniques from the NCG to the adversarial version which then yields
an upper bound on the PoA of O(1 + α/√n).
2 Optimal Networks
Clearly, every optimal network must be 2-edge connected. Thus, every optimal network
must have at least n edges. We first prove the intuitive fact that if edges get more
expensive, then the optimum networks will have fewer edges.
Theorem 1. Let (G = (V,E), α) and (G′ = (V,E′), α′) be optimal networks on n nodes
in the Adv-NCG for α and α′, respectively. If α′ > α, then |E| ≥ |E′|.
Proof. We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that α′ > α holds and that
network G′ = (V,E′) has strictly more edges than network G = (V,E). Let ∆ = |E′|−|E|
denote this difference.
On the one hand, since (G′, α′) is an optimal network for edge price α′, we have the
social cost of (G′, α′) must be at most the social cost of (G,α′). Thus we have
cost(G′, α′) ≤ cost(G,α′)
⇐⇒ edge(G′, α′) + dist(G′) ≤ edge(G,α′) + dist(G)
⇐⇒ edge(G′, α′)− edge(G,α′) ≤ dist(G)− dist(G′)
⇐⇒ ∆α′ ≤ dist(G)− dist(G′).
On the other hand, since (G,α) is an optimal network for edge price α, we have
cost(G,α) ≤ cost(G′, α)
⇐⇒ edge(G,α) + dist(G) ≤ edge(G′, α) + dist(G′)
⇐⇒ dist(G)− dist(G′) ≤ edge(G′, α)− edge(G,α)
⇐⇒ dist(G)− dist(G′) ≤ ∆α.
Hence, we have ∆α′ ≤ dist(G)− dist(G′) ≤ ∆α, which implies α′ ≤ α which contradicts
our assumption that α′ > α.
Remark 1. Note that the above proof works for any function distG : VG → R+, that is,
in particular also for the NCG [9].
In the following, we show that the landscape of optimum networks is much richer in
the Adv-NCG, compared to the NCG where the optimum is either a clique or a star,
depending on α. In particular, we prove that there are Ω(n2) different optimal topologies.
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Figure 1: Different candidates for optimum networks.
We consider the following types of networks: Here DGn is a clique of n nodes where
we have a double edge between all pairs of nodes. Let DGn,k be a n node clique with
exactly k pairs of nodes which are connected with double edges. Thus, DGn,0 = Gn and
DGn,(n2)
= DGn. Moreover, let Fn denote the fan-graph on n nodes which is a collection
of triangles which all share a single node and let DSn denote a star on n nodes where all
connections between the center and the leaves are double edges. Finally, let Cn be a cycle
of length n.
Clearly, if α = 0, then the optimum network on n nodes must be a DGn, since in
this network no edge deletion of the adversary has any effect, it minimizes the sum of
distances of each agent and since edges are for free.
Now consider what happens, if one pair of agents, say u and v, are just connected via a
single edge instead of a double edge. The probability that the adversary removes this edge
is 1n(n−1)−1 . The removal would cause an increase in distance cost of 1 between u and v and
between v and u. Thus, if α < 2n(n−1)−1 , then agent u and v would individually be better
off buying another edge between each other. Thus, we have the following observation.
Observation 2. If 0 ≤ α ≤ 2n(n−1)−1 , then OPT(n, α) = DGn.
Lemma 1. If 2n(n−1)
((n2)+k)((
n
2)+k+1)
≤ α ≤ 2n(n−1)
((n2)+k)((
n
2)+k−1)
, for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n2) − 1, then the
network DGn,k is optimal.
Proof. Consider network DGn,k with k double edges. Let ui denote a node with exactly
i incident single edges. We have
costG(ui) = edgeG(ui) +
(|E| − i)(n− 1) + i · n
|E| = edgeG(ui) + (n− 1) +
i
|E| ,
because the distance between ui and any other node increases only if the adversary
deletes any of ui’s incident i single edges. The social cost of DGn,k is cost(DGn,k) =∑(n2)−k
i=0 ai · costG(ui), where ai is the number of vertices having exactly i incident single
edges. Note, that
∑(n2)−k
i=0 ai = n. Thus, cost(DGn,k) is
α|E|+
(n2)−k∑
i=0
ai
(
n− 1 + i|E|
)
= α|E|+ n(n− 1) + 1|E|
(n2)−k∑
i=0
ai · i.
Now we simplify the above cost-function. Consider the induced sub-graph G = (V,E′) of
network DGn,k which contains only the single edges of DGn,k. By using the Handshake
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Lemma we obtain
∑(n2)−k
i=0 ai · i =
∑
u∈V degG(u) = 2|E′| = 2(
(
n
2
) − k), where degG(u) is
u’s degree in G. Hence, we have
cost(DGn,k) = α|E|+ n(n− 1) +
2(
(
n
2
)− k)(
n
2
)
+ k
.
Now, if look at the cost difference between DGn,k−1 and DGn,k we get
cost(DGn,k)− cost(DGn,k−1) = α−
2(
(
n
2
)− k + 1)(
n
2
)
+ k − 1 +
2(
(
n
2
)− k)(
n
2
)
+ k
.
The cost difference between DGn,k and DGn,k+1 is
cost(DGn,k)− cost(DGn,k+1) = −α−
2(
(
n
2
)− k)(
n
2
)
+ k
+
2(
(
n
2
)− k − 1)(
n
2
)
+ k + 1
.
Thus, if α = αk where
2(
(
n
2
)− k)(
n
2
)
+ k
− 2(
(
n
2
)− k − 1)(
n
2
)
+ k + 1
≤ αk ≤
2(
(
n
2
)− k + 1)(
n
2
)
+ k − 1 −
2(
(
n
2
)− k)(
n
2
)
+ k
,
then upgrading a single edge to a double or downgrading a double edge to a single in
DGn,k does not decrease the social cost. Since αk <
8
n2
< 2 − 2n < 2 − 2|E|+1 , it follows
that OPT(n, αk) has diameter 1, since otherwise there are two agents u and v having
expected distance at least 2 between each other and inserting the edge uv would decrease
their expected distance to 1 + 1|E|+1 which yields a decrease in social distance cost of at
least 2
(
2− (1 + 1|E|+1)
)
= 2− 2|E|+1 .
Since OPT (n, αk) has diameter 1 we know that we can obtain OPT (n, αk) from DGn,k
by either downgrading some double edges to single edges or by upgrading some single edges
to double edges. We have chosen αk such that downgrading one double edge to a single
edge or upgrading one single edge to a double edge does not decrease the social cost. Since
downgrading or upgrading edges only affects the distance costs of the incident agents it
follows that if downgrading or upgrading one edge does not decrease the social cost, then
downgrading or upgrading more than one edge cannot decrease the social cost as well.
Thus, DGn,k is the optimal network for αk.
Note, that the proof of the above statement implies that the complete graph Gn is an
optimum, if 4
(n2)+1
≤ α < 2− 2
(n2)
.
We also remark that we conjecture that Fig. 1 resembles a snapshot of optimum
networks for increasing α from left to right. In fact, extensive simulations indicate that
the optimum changes from Gn to DSn and then, for slightly larger α for Fn. After this
the cycles in the fan-graph increase and get fewer in number until, finally, for α ∈ Ω(n3)
the cycle appears as optimum.
3 Computing Best Responses and Game Dynamics
In this section we investigate computational aspects of the Adv-NCG. First we analyze
the hardness of computing a best response and the hardness of computing a best possible
multi-swap. Then we analyze a natural process for finding an equilibrium network by
sequentially performing improving moves.
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3.1 Hardness of Best Response Computation
We first introduce useful properties for ruling out multi-buy or multi-delete moves. The
proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 in [16].
Proposition 1. If an agent cannot decrease its expected cost by buying (deleting) one
edge in the Adv-NCG, then buying (deleting) k > 1 edges cannot decrease the agent’s
expected cost.
Lemma 2. If 1 − 1|E|+1 < α < 1 + 1|E|(|E|−1) and if agent u is not an endpoint of any
double-edge in the Adv-NCG, then buying the minimum number of edges such that u’s
expected distance to all nodes in V \ Nu is 2 and to nodes in Nu is 1 + 1|E| is u’s best
response.
Proof. Consider any network (G,α) where u’s expected distance to all nodes in V \Nu is
2 and to all nodes in Nu is 1 +
1
|E| .
Buying an additional edge to some v ∈ Nu in G decreases u’s expected distance to v
by 1|E| . Buying an edge towards a node w /∈ Nu decreases u’s expected distance to w by
1 − 1|E|+1 > 1|E| . Thus if α > 1 − 1|E|+1 , then buying a single edge does not decrease u’s
expected cost. Thus by Proposition 1, agent u cannot improve its expected cost in G by
buying more than one edge.
Swapping an edge to some v ∈ Nu decreases u’s expected distance to v by 1|E| but
increases u’s expected distance to some w ∈ Nu by 1− 1|E| . Swapping an edge towards a
node w /∈ Nu decreases u’s expected distance to w by 1− 1|E| but increases the expected
distance to w ∈ Nu by at least 1− 1|E| .
If u has bought the minimum number of edges such that u’s expected distance to all
nodes in V \Nu is 2 and to all nodes in Nu is 1 + 1|E| , then deleting an edge from some
v ∈ Nu increases u’s expected distance to v by at least 1 + 1|E|(|E|−1) since after deleting
the edge the expected distance between u and v is 2 + 1|E|−1 . Thus, if α < 1 +
1
|E|(|E|−1) ,
then deleting a single edge does not decrease u’s expected cost. Thus, by Proposition 1,
agent u cannot decrease its expected cost by deleting more than one edge.
Now we show that computing the best possible strategy-change is intractable.
Theorem 3.
1. It is NP-hard to compute the best response of agent u in the Adv-NCG.
2. It is W [2]-hard to compute the best multi-swap of agent u in the Adv-NCG.
Proof. We prove both statements by reduction from Minimum-m-connected k-dom-
inating set(Min-(m, k)-CDS) [20] which is defined as follows: Given a graph G = (V,E)
and two natural numbers m and k, find a subset S ⊆ V of minimum size such that every
vertex in V/S is adjacent to at least k vertices in S and the induced sub-graph of S is
m-connected.
(1) For the hardness we give the reduction by Min-(1, 2)-CDS which is a NP-hard problem
as a consequence of Theorem 12. Given the configuration of rest of the graph, agent u
has to pick subset of vertices such that costG(u) is minimized. For any 1 − 1|E|+1 < α <
1 + 1|E|(|E|−1) and if there are no other agent has bought an edge to u, then, by Lemma 2,
the best response is to buy edges to all the nodes in the S. In that case the expected
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eccentricity of u will be at most 2. Since every node w /∈ S is adjacent to at least two
vertices in S, the distance to u cannot increase due to single edge-deletion. Since S is
connected, u has expected distance at most 1 + 1|E| to all nodes in S.
(2) Consider that agent u has budget b, then it follows from Lemma 2 and the above proof
of (1), that the best response will be to create edges to the vertices in S of size at most
b. By Theorem 12 (See Appendix) Min-(1, 2)-CDS parameterized by the size of the set S
is W[2]-hard.
Now, if there exists a Min-(1, 2)-CDS S of size at most b then S must be a subset of
u’s best response. Hence if we know the best response of agent u then we can solve the
parameterized version of Min-(1, 2)-CDS of G by checking all possible subsets of u’s best
response in 2bO(n) time.
3.2 Game Dynamics
We investigate the dynamic properties of the Adv-NCG. That is, we turn the model into
a sequential version which starts with some initial network (G,α) and then agents move
sequentially in some order and perform improving moves, if possible. One natural question
is, if this process is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
For the game dynamics of the Adv-NCG we prove the strongest possible negative
result, which essentially shows that there is no hope for convergence if agents stick to
performing improving moves only. In particular, we prove that the order of the agents
moves or any tie-breaking between different improving moves does not help for achieving
convergence. This result is even stronger than the best known non-convergence results
for the NCG [13].
Theorem 4. The Adv −NCG is not weakly acyclic.
Proofsketch. We prove the statement by giving a best response cycle (G1, α), . . . , (G7, α),
where (G1, α) = (G7, α) and (Gi+1, α) is obtained from (Gi, α) by an improving move of
one agent in (Gi, α). Our best response cycle has the special features that in every step
of the cycle there is exactly one agent who can perform an improving move and that this
improving move is unique. Thus, starting with (G1, α), any sequence of improving moves
must be infinite. The best response cycle on 10 agents with α = 10.3 is depicted in Fig. 2.
We omit the quite lengthy proof that the shown best response cycle behaves as indicated.
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Figure 2: A best response cycle for α = 10.3, where in every step only the red agent has
an improving move and this improving move is unique.
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The interested reader can get more details and a Python-script performing an exhaustive
search on all possible strategy-changes from the authors.
4 Analysis of Networks in Nash Equilibrium
In this section we establish the existence of networks in Nash Equilibrium for almost the
whole parameter space and we compare NE networks in the Adv-NCG with NE networks
from the NCG [9] and Kliemann’s adversarial model [14]. Moreover, we investigate struc-
tural properties which allow us to provide bounds on the Price of Stability and the Price
of Anarchy.
We start with the existence result:
Theorem 5. The networks DGn and DSn are in pure Nash Equilibrium if α ≤ 1n(n−1)−1
and α ≥ 1− 12n−1 , respectively.
Proof. We start with proving that the double clique network DGn where every agents
owns an edge to all other agents is in Nash Equilibrium if α ≤ 1n(n−1)−1 .
Clearly, in DGn no agent can improve its expected distance cost by buying one or
more edges since each agent already has the minimum possible expected distance cost.
The same holds true for performing edge-swaps. Swapping an edge yields a single towards
some other node in the network which then yields an expected distance towards this node
which is strictly larger than 1. Since the edge-cost stays the same and the expected
distance cost increases by swapping edges, no agent can improve by swapping one or more
edges. It remains to analyze edge-deletions. In DGn every agent has expected distance
cost of n− 1. Deleting 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 edges yields expected distance cost of
(n(n− 1)− 2k)(n− 1) + kn
n(n− 1)− k = n− 1 +
k
n(n− 1)− k ≥ n− 1 +
1
n(n− 1)− 1 .
Thus, if α ≤ 1n(n−1)−1 then deleting one or more edges is not an improving move.
Next, we show that the double star DSn with arbitrary edge-ownership is in Nash
Equilibrium if α ≥ 1− 12n−1 .
Clearly, no agent can delete edges since this destroys the 2-edge-connectedness of the
network which then induces infinite cost. Moreover, no agent can swap edges since this
does not change the edge cost but increases the expected distance cost. Thus, we are
left to analyze edge purchases. Clearly the center of the double star cannot buy edges to
decrease its cost. Hence, we analyze edge purchases by non-center nodes of DSn. Every
such agent has expected distance cost of 1 + 2(n− 2) = 2n− 3.
Let u be a non-center agent and let Su be u’s current strategy in network G = DSn.
Assume that agent u can change its strategy from Su to S
′
u and thereby strictly decrease
its cost. Let G′ be the network G after u’s strategy-change from Su to S′u. We claim that
if α > 1n−1 and if G
′ contains at least three edges between the center vertex and u or if
there are at least two edges between u and some other non-center vertex v, then agent u
has a strategy S′′u, which strictly outperforms strategy S′u and where the corresponding
network G′′ has exactly two edges between the center vertex and u and at most one edge
between u and any other non-center vertex. Thus, we can assume that if agent u has
an improving strategy-change, then there exists an improving strategy-change towards a
strategy which buys only additional single edges towards other non-center vertices. After
proving the above claim, we will prove that no such improving strategy-change exists
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if α ≥ 1 − 12n−1 > 1n−1 , which then implies that DSn is in Nash Equilibrium for all
α ≥ 1− 12n−1 .
Now we prove the claim: We first show that strategy S′u can be improved if G′ contains
at least three edges between the center vertex and u. In this case this implies that u owns
at least one edge towards the center vertex and that agent u could remove one edge from
G′ to ensure that at least two edges between its and the center vertex remain. Let G′′ be
the network G′ after the edge-removal and let S′′u be the strategy S′u without the removed
edge. This removal would save α in edge-cost. If u has no single edges towards any non-
center vertex, then its expected distance cost in G′′ would not increase compared to its
expected distance cost in G′ by the edge-removal since all edges on all its shortest paths
are backed up by another parallel edge. Since α > 0, S′′u strictly outperforms strategy S′u.
If u has 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2 single edges towards k different non-center vertices in G′, then the
edge-removal of one edge between u and the center vertex increases the probability that
one of the k edges is destroyed by the adversary. The probability increases by
k
m(m− 1) ≤
n− 2
2n(2n− 1) <
1
n− 1 ,
where m ≥ 2n is the number of edges in G′. Thus, agent u’s expected distance cost in
G′′ increases by at most 14n compared to its expected distance cost in G
′. Since α > 1n−1 ,
it follows that S′′u strictly outperforms S′u. If G′′ contains more than three edges between
u and the center vertex, then we can apply the above argument iteratively to obtain a
strategy S′′u which strictly outperforms S′u and a corresponding network G′′ which has
exactly two edges between u and the center vertex.
Now we show that strategy S′u can be improved if G′ contains at least two edges
between u and some other non-center vertex v. Note that in this case all edges between
u and v are bought by agent u.
It is possible that in network G′ there is no edge or only one edge between u and the
center vertex. If there is no edge between u and the center vertex, then agent u could
swap two edges from v to the center vertex and thereby strictly decrease its cost. This
is true since this swap would decrease u’s expected distance to every vertex w 6= v by
at least 1 and it only increases its expected distance to v by 1. If there is exactly one
edge between u and the center vertex, then agent u could swap one edge from v to the
center vertex and thereby decrease its cost. This swap may create a single edge towards
v but if this edge is attacked by the adversary then this only increases u’s distance to v
by 1 whereas in G′ an attack on the single edge between u and the center vertex increases
u’s distances to n − 2 vertices by at least 1. Hence, if there is no edge or only one edge
between u and the center-vertex, then in both cases there is a strategy S′′u which strictly
outperforms strategy S′u and where the corresponding network G′′ has exactly two edges
between u and the center vertex. Thus, we will assume in the following that there are
exactly two edges between u and the center vertex and at least two edges between u and
some non-center vertex v.
Let G′′ be the network obtained from network G′ by removing one of the edges between
u and v and let S′′u be u’s strategy obtained by removing the mentioned edge from S′u. If
there are at least two edges between u and v in G′′, then an analogous argument as above
yields that S′′u strictly outperforms S′u if α >
1
n−1 >
n−3
2n(2n+1) . Note that in this case G
′
has at least 2n + 1 many edges. If there is a single edge between u and v in G′′, then
the number of non-center vertices to which u has a single edge increases by 1 from k to
k + 1 for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 3. Thus, its expected distance cost compared to network G′
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increases by
k + 1
2n− 1 −
k
2n
=
2n+ k
2n(2n− 1) ≤
1
2n− 1 +
n− 3
2n(2n− 1) <
1
n− 1 ,
which implies that S′′u strictly outperforms strategy S′u if α >
1
n−1 .
Having settled the claim, we now analyze the case where a non-center agent u buys
1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2 single edges to k other non-center nodes. In this case u’s expected distance
cost is
2(n− 1)(k + 1 + 2(n− 2− k)) + k(k + 2(n− 2− k + 1))
2(n− 1) + k
=2n− 3− k + k
2(n− 1) + k .
Since −k + k2(n−1)+k ≥ −1 + 12(n−1)+1 = −1 + 12n−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 it follows that the
expected distance cost after buying 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 single edges is at least 2n − 3 − 1 +
1
2(n−1)+1 . Thus if α ≥ 1− 12n−1 , then buying one or more single edges is not an improving
move for any non-center agent.
Since α ≥ 1 − 12n−1 > 14n , it follows that no non-center vertex can buy one or more
edges in network DSn to strictly decrease its cost.
Next, we show that NE in the Adv-NCG are not comparable with NE from the NCG or
Kliemann’s model.
Theorem 6. There is a NE in the Adv-NCG which is not an NE in the NCG and vice
versa. The analogous statement also holds for Kliemann’s model.
Proof. We compare the Nash equilibria of the Adv-NCG with the equilibria of the NCG [9]
and equilibria of Kliemann’s model [14]. Although the Adv-NCG can be understood as
a mixture of both modes, we will show that the Nash equilibria of both models can be
quite different from the Adv-NCG. Clearly, NE in the Adv-NCG are 2-edge-connected,
thus we should compare only 2-edge-connected equilibria of all models.
First we show that there is a 2-edge-connected NE the NCG that is not a NE for the
Adv-NCG, and vice versa. Consider the network G depicted in Fig 3 a), is a NE for the
b
ca
d
a) NE for Adv-NCG
b
ca
d
b) NE for NCG
Figure 3: Comparison of NE for NCG and Adv-NCG models
Adv-NCG if 1115 ≤ α ≤ 75 . But this network is not a NE in the NCG, because agent b
could delete the edge {b, c} and thereby decrease its cost from α+ 3 to 4 if 1 < α ≤ 75 .
For the reversed statement it is easy to see,that network G′, depicted in Fig. 3 b) is a
NE in the NCG, but is not a NE in the Adv-NCG if 1 ≤ α ≤ 75 .
The main difference between Kliemann’s model and the Adv-NCG is the 2-edge-
connectedness. It means, that in Kliemann’s model any agent has an individual cost
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Cv(S) = |Sv| · α, if the network is 2-edge-connected. It follows, that DGn is a NE in our
model for very small α, but DGn is not a NE in Kliemann’s model.
Converse, for any small α a cycle where every agent owns exactly one edge is a NE in
Kliemann’s model, but it is not a NE for small α in the Adv-NCG.
4.1 Relation between the Diameter and the Social Cost
We prove a property which relates the diameter of a network with its social cost. With
this, we prove that one of the most useful tools for analyzing NE in the NCG [9] can be
carried over to the Adv-NCG.
Before we start, we analyze the diameter increase induced by removing a single edge
in a 2-edge-connected network.
Lemma 3. Let G = (V,E) be any 2-edge-connected network having diameter D and let
G− e be the network G where some edge e ∈ E is removed. Then the diameter of G− e
is at most 2D.
Proof. Let e = {u, v} be the edge which is removed from a diameter D network G to obtain
the network G−e. Consider any shortest path P in G which uses edge e somewhere along
the path. Let x and y be the endpoints of path P and we assume that u and v are the
endpoints of e which are closer to x and y, respectively.
Since G is 2-edge-connected, we can find a smallest cycle C in G which includes edge e.
Let z be a node in the cycle C which has maximum distance to edge e, that is, maximum
distance to both u and v simultaneously. There exists a shortest path Pxz in G which
connects x and z, and there is a shortest path Pzy in G which connects z and y. Both
paths have length at most D. Observe, that it is impossible that both paths Pxz and Pzy
contain edge e, since otherwise there must be a shorter path between x and z or z and y.
If both of the paths do not contain edge e, then Pxz ∪ Pzy is a path between nodes x
and y in the network G− e and it has a length at most 2D.
Finally, consider a situation where exactly one of the paths contains edge e in G and
let this be path Pxz. Thus, we have that Pxz = Pxv∪{v, u}∪Puz or Pxz = Pxu∪{u, v}∪Pvz
in graph G and both of the paths Puz and Pvz are parts of the cycle C. By choice of z, it
follows that Pxv ∪ Pvz or Pxu ∪ Puz is a path between x and z in graph G− e which has
length at most D. Since the path Pzy does not contain edge e, it follows that it can be
used in graph G− e. Since Pzy has length at most D, we have that the distance between
nodes x and y in G− e is at most 2D.
Next, we will focus on edges which are part of cuts of the network of size two. Remember
that a bridge is an edge whose removal from a network increases the number of connected
components of that network. Let G = (V,E) be any 2-edge-connected network. We say
that an edge e ∈ E is a 2-cut-edge if there exists a cut of G of size 2 which contains edge
e. Equivalently, e is a 2-cut-edge of G if its removal from G creates at least one bridge in
G−e. We now bound the number of 2-cut-edges in any 2-edge-connected network G. This
is an important structural result, since this proves that the amount of edge-overbuilding
due to the adversary is sharply limited.
Lemma 4. Any 2-edge-connected network G with n nodes can have at most 2(n−1) edges
which are 2-cut-edges.
Proof. Let e be any 2-cut-edge in network G. By definition, the removal of e creates one
or more bridges in G − e. Let b1, . . . , bl denote those bridges. Note, that b1, . . . , bl also
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must be 2-cut-edges in G. Moreover, it follows that there must be a shortest cycle C in
G which contains all the edges e, b1, . . . , bl. If there are more than one such cycles, then
fix one of them. We call the fixed cycle C a cut-cycle.
Notice that any 2-cut-edge corresponds to exactly one cut-cycle in the network and
that every cut-cycle contains at least two 2-cut-edges. We show in the following that if
any cut-cycle in the network contains at least three 2-cut-edges, then we can modify the
network to obtain strictly more 2-cut-edges and strictly more cut-cycles. This implies
that the number of 2-cut-edges is maximized if the number of cut-cycles is maximized
and every cut-cycle contains exactly two 2-cut-edges.
Now we describe the procedure which converts any network with at least one cut-cycle
containing at least three 2-cut-edges into a modified network with a strictly increased
number of cut-cycles and 2-cut-edges (see Fig. 4).
vl+1
vl+2vl
vl+1
vl+2vl
a) Conversion of adjacent 2-cut-edges
vl
vmvp+1
vl+1
vm+1vp
vl
vmvp+1
vl+1
vm+1vp
b) Conversion of non-adjacent 2-cut-edges
Figure 4: Increasing the number of 2-cut-edges by splitting up a cut-cycle.
Let G be any network with at least one cut-cycle C = v1, . . . , vk, v1 containing at
least three 2-cut-edges. If there are two adjacent 2-cut-edges {vl, vl+1}, {vl+1, vl+2} in
cycle C, then delete the 2-cut-edge {vl, vl+1} and insert two new edges {vl, vl+2} and
{vl+1, vl+2}. First of all, note that these new edges have not been present in network G
before the insertion since otherwise {{vl, vl+1}, {vl+1, vl+2}} cannot be a cut of G. We
claim that both new edges are 2-cut-edges and that the cycle C is divided into two new
cut-cycles v1, . . . , vl, vl+2, . . . , vk, v1 and vl+1, vl+2, vl+1. Indeed, there are at least two
bridges {vl+1, vl+2} and {vk, vk+1} in the cut-cycle C after deleting {vl, vl+1}, and both of
them end up in different new cut-cycles. Hence, deleting any of the newly inserted edges
{vl, vl+2} or {vl+1, vl+2} implies that {vk, vk+1} or {vl+1, vl+2} becomes a bridge. Thus,
both new edges are 2-cut-edges and both of new cycles are cut-cycles.
If there are three pairwise non-adjacent 2-cut-edges {vl, vl+1}, {vm, vm+1}, {vp, vp+1}
in cycle C, then delete one 2-cut-edge {vl, vl+1} and insert two new edges {vl, vp+2} and
{vl+1, vm+1}. Analogous to above, both new edges cannot be already present in G and
both are 2-cut-edges because deleting any of them renders edge {vm, vm+1} or {vp, vp+1}
a bridge. Moreover, cut-cycle C is divided into two new cut-cycles.
Finally, we claim that the maximum number of cut-cycles in any n-vertex network G
is at most n−1. Since we know that every such cut-cycle contains exactly two 2-cut-edges
this then implies that there can be at most 2(n− 1) 2-cut-edges in any network G.
Now we prove the above claim. Note that applying our transformation does not
disconnect the network. Thus, we know that network G after all transformations is
connected. Now we iteratively choose any cut-cycle C in G and we delete the two 2-
cut-edges contained in C. This deletion increases the number of connected components
of the current network by exactly 1. We repeat this process until we have destroyed all
cut-cycles in G. Note that deleting edges from G may create new cut-cycles, but we
never destroy more than one of them at a time. Thus, since each iteration increases the
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number of connected components of the network by 1, it follows that there can be at
most n−1 iterations since network G with n vertices cannot have more than n connected
components.
Remark 2. Lemma 4 is tight, since a path of length n − 1, where all neighboring nodes
are connected via double edges, has exactly 2(n− 1) 2-cut-edges.
Now we relate the diameter with the social cost.
Theorem 7. Let (G,α) be any NE network on n nodes having diameter D and let
OPT (n, α) be the optimum network on n nodes for the same edge-cost α. Then we have
that
cost(G,α)
cost(OPT (n, α))
∈ O(D).
Proof. Since OPT (n, α) must be 2-edge-connected, it must have at least n edges. More-
over, the minimum expected distance between each pair of vertices in OPT (n, α) is at
least 1. Thus, we have that cost(OPT (n, α)) ∈ Ω(α · n+ n2).
Now we analyze the social cost of the NE network (G,α), where G = (V,E). We have
cost(G,α) = edge(G,α) + dist(G) and we will analyze both terms separately. We start
with an upper bound on dist(G).
Since (G,α) has diameter D and since (G,α) is 2-edge-connected, Lemma 3 implies
that the expected distance between each pair of vertices in (G,α) is at most 2D. Thus,
we have that dist(G) ∈ O(n2 ·D).
Now we analyze edge(G,α). By Lemma 4 we have at most 2n many 2-cut-edges in G.
Buying all those edges yields cost of at most 2n · α.
We proceed with bounding the number of non-2-cut-edges in G. We consider any
agent v and analyze how many non-2-cut-edges agent v can have bought. We claim that
this number is in O (nDα ), which yields total edge-cost of O(nD) for agent v. Summing
up over all n agents, this yields total edge-cost of O(n2D) for all non-2-cut-edges of G.
This then implies an upper bound of O(α ·n+n2D) on the social cost of G which finishes
the proof.
Now we prove our claim. Fix any non-2-cut-edge e = {v, w} of G which is owned by
agent v. Let Ve ⊂ V be the set of nodes of G to which all shortest paths from v traverse
the edge e.
We first show that removing the edge e increases agent v’s expected distance to any
node in Ve to at most 4D. By Lemma 3, removing edge e increases the diameter of G from
D to at most 2D. Since e is a non-2-cut-edge, we have that G−e is still 2-edge-connected.
Thus, again by Lemma 3, it follows that agent v’s expected distance to any other node in
G− e is at most 4D.
However, removing edge e not only increases v’s expected distance towards all nodes
in Ve, instead, since G− e has a less many edges than G, agent v’s expected distance to
all other nodes in V \ (Ve∪{v}) increases as well. We now proceed to bound this increase
in expected distance cost.
We compare agent v’s expected distance cost in network G and in network G− e. Let
m denote the number of edges in G. Thus, G− e has m− 1 many edges. For network G
agent v’s expected distance cost is
distG(v) =
1
m
∑
f∈E
δG−f (v) =
1
m
∑
f∈E\{e}
δG−f (v) +
δG−e(v)
m
.
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In network G− e, we have distG−e(v) = 1m−1
∑
f∈E\{e} δG−e−f (v). Now we upper bound
the increase in expected distance cost for agent v due to removal of edge e from G.
distG−e(v)− distG(v) is
1
m− 1
∑
f∈E\{e}
δG−e−f (v)−
 1
m
∑
f∈E\{e}
δG−f (v) +
δG−e(v)
m

=
∑
f∈E\{e}
(
δG−e−f (v)
m− 1 −
δG−f (v)
m
)
− δG−e(v)
m
.
We have that δG−e−f (v) ≤ δG−f (v) + |Ve| · 4D, since in G − e − f only the distances to
nodes in Ve increase, compared to the network G − f and since e is a non-2-cut-edge in
G. Moreover, by Lemma 3, the distances to nodes in Ve in G− e− f increase to at most
4D for each node in Ve. Thus, we have that distG−e(v)− distG(v) is∑
f∈E\{e}
(
δG−e−f (v)
m− 1 −
δG−f (v)
m
)
− δG−e(v)
m
≤
∑
f∈E\{e}
(
δG−f (v) + |Ve|4D
m− 1 −
δG−f (v)
m
)
= |Ve|4D +
∑
f∈E\{e}
(
δG−f (v)
m(m− 1)
)
≤ |Ve|4D +
∑
f∈E\{e}
(
2D · n
n(m− 1)
)
≤ |Ve|4D + 4D = (|Ve|+ 1)4D.
Since G is in Nash Equilibrium, we know that removing edge e is not an improving move
for agent v. Thus, we have that
α ≤ (|Ve|+ 1)4D ⇐⇒ |Ve| ≥ α
4D
− 1.
Thus, for all non-2-cut-edges e which are bought by agent v, we have that |Ve| ∈ Ω( αD ).
Since all these sets Ve are disjoint, it follows that v can have bought at most
n
Ω( α
D
) ∈ O(nDα )
many non-2-cut-edges.
4.2 Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy
Theorem 8. If α ≤ 1n(n−1)−1 , then the PoS is 1. If 1n(n−1)−1 < α < 2n(n−1)−1 , then PoS
is strictly larger than 1, if α > 1− 12n−1 , then the PoS is at most 2.
Proof. By Theorem 5 and Observation 2 DGn network is optimal and is a Nash equilib-
rium when α ≤ 1n(n−1)−1 . Thus, price of stability is 1 for this value of α.
The second statement holds, since DGn is the unique optimum for α ≤ 2n(n−1)−1 but
any agent could delete an edge and thereby increase its expected distance cost by 1n(n−1)−1 .
Thus, if 1n(n−1)−1 < α ≤ 2n(n−1)−1 , then this edge-deletion is an improving move which
shows that DGn is not a NE.
The third statement follows from Theorem 5 and the simple lower bound on the
expected social cost of the optimum from the proof of Theorem 7. Thus, for α > 1− 12n−1
the PoS is at most cost(DSn)
nα+n2
= 2(n−1)α+2(n−1)
2
nα+n2
≤ 2.
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We now show how to adapt two techniques from the NCG for bounding the diameter of
equilibrium networks to our adversarial version. This can be understood as a proof of
concept showing that the Adv-NCG can be analyzed as rigorously as the NCG. However,
carrying over the currently strongest general diameter bound of 2O(
√
logn) due to Demaine
et al. [7], which is based on interleaved region-growing arguments seems challenging due
to the fact that we can only work with expected distances.
We start with a simple diameter upper bound based on [9].
Theorem 9. The diameter of any NE network (G,α) is in O(√α).
Proof. We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that there are agents u and v
in network G with dG(u, v) ≥ 4`, for some `. Since expected distances cannot be shorter
than distances in G, it follows that u’s expected distance to v is at least 4`. If u buys
an edge to v for the price of α then u’s decrease in expected distance cost is at least
|E|
|E|+1(4`− 1 + 4`− 3 + · · ·+ 1) = |E||E|+12`2.
Thus, if dG(u, v) > 4
√
α, then u′s decrease in expected distance cost by buying the
edge uv is at least |E||E|+12α > α. Thus, if the diameter of G is at least 4
√
α, then there is
some agent who has an improving move.
Together with Theorem 7 this yields the following statement:
Corollary 1. The Price of Anarchy of the Adv-NCG is in O(√α).
Next, we show how to adapt a technique by Albers et al. [1] to get a stronger statement,
which implies constant PoA for α ∈ O(√n).
Theorem 10. The Price of Anarchy of the Adv-NCG is in O
(
1 + α√
n
)
.
Proof. We use Theorem 7 and give an improved bound on the expected diameter of any
NE network. Let the expected diameter of the network be d and consider nodes u and v
which have expected distance d.
Let B be the set of nodes in the network which are at expected distance of d′ =
⌊
d−1
8
⌋
from node u. First, we analyze the change in expected distance cost of agent v if it buys
an edge towards u. Consider any node w ∈ B. By Lemma 3 we have that without edge
{v, u} agent v has expected distance of at least d2 − d′ towards w. After buying the edge
{v, u}, v’s expected distance to w is at most (1+d′)|E|+d|E|+1 . Thus, v’s expected distance to
w decreases by at least
d
2
− d′ −
( |E|d′ + |E|+ d
|E|+ 1
)
≥ d
2
− 2d′ − 2 > d− 8
4
.
It follows that by buying the edge vu agent v’s expected distance cost decreases by at
least d−84 |B|. Since G is in NE, it follows that α ≥ (d−84 )|B|.
Now consider node u which has expected distance of at most d′ to any node B. Thus,
by Lemma 3, and since dG(u, v) ≥ d2 , we know that there must be nodes w ∈ B with
dG(u,w) =
d′
2 . Let D denote set of all nodes w in B with dG(u,w) ≤ d
′
2 . For any node
w ∈ D let
Sw = {x | w is the last node in D on a shortest path from u to x}.
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If Sw is non-empty, then dG(u,w) is
d′
2 . Since there are n − |D| nodes outside of D it
follows, that there must be some node w with |Sw| ≥ n−|D||D| . If u buys the edge {u,w},
then u’s expected distance cost decreases by at least(
d′
2
− |E|+
d′
2
|E|+ 1
)
|Sw| ≥
(
d′
4
− 1
2
)
|Sw|.
Since G is an NE, it follows that α ≥
(
d′
4 − 12
)
|Sw| ≥
(
d′
4 − 12
)
n−|D|
|D| . By rearranging we
get
|D|2α ≥ |D|
(
α+
(
d′
4
− 1
2
))
≥
(
d′
4
− 1
2
)
n,
where the first inequality holds since α ≥ d > d′−24 because G is in NE. Thus, we have
|B| ≥ |D| ≥ (d′ − 2) n8α .
From α ≥ (d−84 )|B|, we get α ≥
(
d−8
4
) (
d′−2
8α
)
n ⇐⇒ 8α2 > (d2 − 2)(d′ − 2)n. Since
d
2 > d
′ we have
8α2 ≥ (d′ − 2)2n ⇐⇒
√
8
n
α ≥ (d′ − 2) ≥ (d− 1
8
− 3).
Hence, we have 25 + 8
√
8α√
n
≥ d.
Theorem 11. The Price of Anarchy of the Adv-NCG is at least 2 and for very large α
this bound is tight.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary large α, e.g. α = 2n. In that case the optimum network
must be a cycle whereas, by Theorem 5, the network DSn is in Nash Equilibrium for
this α. Since DSn has 2(n− 1) edges and since in this range of alpha the edge-cost term
dominates the social cost, the lower bound follows. The tight upper bound for large α
follows from Lemma 4, since 2-cut-edges cannot be deleted without creating a bridge.
5 Conclusion
Our work is the first step towards incorporating both centrality and robustness aspects
in a simple and accessible model for selfish network creation. In essence we proved that
many properties and techniques can be carried over from the non-adversarial NCG and
we indicated that the landscape of optimum and equilibrium networks in the Adv-NCG
is much more diverse than without adversary. As for the NCG, proving strong upper
or lower bounds on the PoA is very challenging. Especially surprising is the hardness of
constructing higher lower bounds than in the NCG since by introducing suitable gadgets it
is always possible to enforce that no agent wants to swap or delete edges. A non-constant
lower bound on the PoA seems possible if α is linear in n.
It would also be interesting to consider different adversaries. An obvious candidate
for this is node-removal at random. Another promising choice is a local adversary, where
every agent considers that some of its incident edges may fail. This local perspective
combined with a centrality aspect could explain why many selfishly built networks have
a high clustering coefficient.
Another direction is to consider the swap version [19, 8] of the Adv-NCG, especially in
the case where all agents own at least 2 edges. We note in passing, that the swap-version
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of the Adv-NCG is not a potential game. The following improving move cycle shows
that even if agents are only allowed to perform multi-swaps, then infinite sequences of
improving moves are possible.
a c
d
e f
g h
b c
d
e f
g h
a c
d
e f
g h
b c
d
e f
g h
a b a b b c
d
e f
g h
a
G1 G2 G3 G4 G1
Figure 5: Improving Move Cycle for Swap Version
Moreover creating equilibrium networks having diameter 4 is already very challenging.
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A Appendix
Theorem 12. Given graph G(V,E)
1. It is NP -hard to compute Min-(1, 2)-CDS.
2. It is W [2]-hard to compute Min-(1, 2)-CDS parameterized by solution set S.
Proof. Let V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} and E vertex set of a graph G(V,E), produce an new
instance G′(V ′, E′) where, V ′ = V ∪ u and E′ = E⋃i∈[n]{vi, u}.
(1) We prove hardness by giving polynomial time reduction to Dominating-Set prob-
lem which is well known NP-complete problem.
Now consider the Min-(1, 2)-CDS S of G′. We have |S| = |D| + 1, where D is a
minimum dominating set of G. This holds, since if |S| > |D| + 1, then we could
simply replace S by D ∪ {u} and obtain a smaller Min-(1, 2)-CDS. If |S| < |D|+ 1,
then, since in S every node is connected to two dominating nodes and since S is
connected, we can delete an element from S to obtain a dominating set D′ with
|D′| < |D|.
Now consider G′ there will can be only two possibilities for the solution set S of
Min-(1, 2)-CDS of G′:
(a) If S contains u, then S \ {u} is a minimum dominating set of G.
(b) If S does not contain u, then we can delete any element from S to obtain a
minimum dominating set of G.
(2) We prove W [2] hardness of the Min-(1, 2)-CDS parameterized by solution set S by
giving a fpt-reduction to parameterized Dominating-Set which is known to be
W [2]-complete.
For the reduction, create input instance (G′, k + 1) for Min-(1, 2)-CDS. From the
proof of (1) we know that S always contains a dominating set of G. Thus if there
exist a Min-(1, 2)-CDS of size at most k + 1 then there exist a dominating set in G
of size at most k.
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